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degradation and shortage of water.
Diamond points also to a growing disparity between the super-rich flocking
in to enjoy the scenery and the economically distressed local population
whose means of livelihood are being
eroded, and the political tensions that
inevitably result.
This same confluence of problems,
many coming as a result of conscious
decisions on the part of leaders or citizens, is being played out across the
globe. One would expect Africa, the perennial loser in such comparisons, to
hold the anchor position as the continent most likely to fail. Not so. Australia heads the list, due to the legacy of
aggressive importation of harmful species; government policies that promote
and reward deforestation and soil ruination; destruction of aquatic habitats
needed for sustainable fisheries; and
other problems. Diamond opines that
these conditions are not irreversible but
that the continent’s sustainable population is probably around eight million,
somewhat less than half its current
level. While one may question the exactitude of the eight-million figure, his
case of overpopulation in relation to
sustainability over time is well made, at
least in terms of capacity for food
production.
Turning to Africa, Diamond offers an
instructive analysis of the Rwandan
genocide. Taking a Malthusian view
over the more common Hutu-versusTutsi source of disruption, he demonstrates how a complex mixture of poverty, fear, and opportunism, not tribal
affiliation, drove the genocide. In the final analysis it all came down to land. As
the population exceeded the land’s ability to sustain it, the traditional fabric of
Rwandan society was ripped apart. This
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situation was exploited by government,
tribal, and even religious leaders who
turned the destitute against the merely
poverty stricken. The result was the
mass murder of people who had some
land by those who had none.
For all the apparent doom and gloom,
Diamond is cautiously optimistic about
the future. Despite past failures, there
are too many stories of societies successfully adapting to changing circumstances for us to despair. Technology
can also contribute to success, though
we are wise not to consider advances as
a panacea. As to the importance of
turning things around, he notes that today’s terrorists may be well educated
and moneyed but argues that “they still
depend on a desperate society for support and toleration.” He further notes,
“well nourished societies, offering good
job prospects . . . don’t offer broad support to their fanatics.” Perhaps it is this
angle, if not that of survival itself, that
holds the greatest interest for today’s
national security community.
THOMAS E. SEAL

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

George, Roger Z., and Robert D. Kline, eds. Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges. Washington, D.C.:
National Defense Univ. Press, 2004. 564pp. $150

The current climate of reform and
blame affecting the intelligence community can deflect attention from its
substance and value as a contributor to
policy and military operations. Lost in
the shuffle of reorganization and fingerpointing are issues that will consistently
remain important challenges—matters
of defining and improving analysis,
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educating intelligence consumers on the
possibilities and constraints of intelligence, dealing with the embedded and
new challenges of collection in a world
dominated by previously unimagined
threats, and balancing security with the
need to share. It is against this backdrop
that the editors, George and Kline, have
collected essays by an impressive list of
authors addressing many of the issues
especially salient to intelligence practitioners and their consumers in this time
of reflection and reform.
The anthology provides an excellent
baseline for educating any analyst or
consumer, new or experienced, on
many of the issues consistently at play
within the intelligence community.
Providing content and context to the issues of requirements, collection, exploitation, analysis, and consumer use, the
book provides an excellent foundation
for understanding the challenges inherent in each part of the intelligence cycle.
It is ideal for its intended use as a textbook for future analysts and policy
makers, and is equally suited for anyone
interested in how the intelligence community and its components operate.
The book is well organized, providing
different perspectives on important issues. The organization allows the
reader, as any great anthology does, to
pick up the book and select an article or
group of articles. An additional benefit
of the thoughtfully considered collection is the diversity of perspectives. Essays by practitioners, theorists, and
consumers each give glimpses into
every role that might not otherwise be
known. This range of views helps meet
the stated intentions of the book—to
stir thought on how the community
does and should work and how it
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should best serve all of its diplomatic,
policy, and military consumers.
Some sections are particularly thought
provoking. The essays devoted to “Intelligence and the Military,” for example,
make the reader consider what kinds
of options are available and should be
pursued in strengthening the relationship between military and civilian intelligence practitioners and agencies:
Where should the lines for collection,
analysis, and dissemination be drawn or
redrawn in order to exploit most effectively each group’s relative strengths?
Or more basically, what are the real
strengths of each outfit? What should
they be?
The parts devoted to the “Challenges of
Analysis” and “The Perils of Policy Support” produce valuable insights into
how the different organizations are
configured for their roles in the intelligence process. The “Challenges of Analysis” section describes some of the
ongoing challenges of analysis and how
the CIA, primarily, has developed
methods to address these challenges.
“The Perils of Policy Support” describes
how consumers view and use intelligence. However, and though both of
the last-named sections provide interesting insights into how each side currently operates, they offer little in the
way of suggestions for improving the
status quo. Perhaps an additional article
in each of these sections, proposing or
otherwise articulating several options
for the way ahead, based on current legislative language or the state of debate,
would be warranted in a future edition.
Deception, while a critical issue, probably
gets too much play. Its treatment is a bit
too founded in historical examples. In the
realms of open sources, cyberspace, and
network-centric adversaries, deception
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issues and means of evaluation are different. While practitioners and consumers should necessarily be encouraged
to learn the lessons and benefits of deception, perhaps this section should be
coupled with the one devoted to opensource analysis to discuss the still
unwieldy problems of the future of
intelligence—reams of information
from a variety of unknown sources that
current “INT” equipment and methods
are not ready to handle.
Overall, this book is remarkably valuable to any course dealing with the intelligence community. As it is used in
classes, the outcomes of the debates it
will inevitably create should themselves become anthologies for future
readers.
JAMIESON JO MEDBY

RAND Corporation

William J. Lahneman, ed. Military Intervention:
Cases in Context for the 21st Century, Oxford,
U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. 224 pp. $26.95

Most students of international affairs
would agree that understanding the
causes and results of military interventions is one of the more pressing security
issues facing the United States in the
early years of the twenty-first century.
William Lahneman, program coordinator of the Center for International and
Security Studies at the University of
Maryland, has assembled a gifted group
of analysts to examine seven instances of
military intervention and, through the
use of a common set of pertinent questions, attempt to reach a deeper understanding of interventions, while
identifying ways to increase the chances
of success in an intervention.
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The eleven contributors to this volume
have impressive credentials. Together,
they compose a potent mix of security
scholars and practitioners. In addition to
Lahneman himself, of special note are
William Zartman and John Steinbruner.
Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organizations and
Conflict Resolution, and the Director of
Conflict Management at the Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
John Steinbruner, Director of the Center
for International and Security Studies at
the School of Public Policy, University
of Maryland, is also the author of The
Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton
Univ. Press, 2002), a seminal work in the
study of decision making.
Military Intervention examines six cases
of military intervention: Somalia
(1992), Bosnia (1991–94), Haiti (1994),
Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone (2000),
and East Timor (1999). A seventh case
involving Cambodia is also provided,
although in this instance, rather than
focusing on a single intervention, the
authors examine interventions from
1806 to 2003. Lahneman’s stated intention was that each case be examined
through the lens of nine discrete questions, ranging from the nature of the
intervention force to the extent to
which nonmilitary aspects of the intervention were necessary and sufficient to
produce a lasting peace. As analytical
approaches go, this one seems well
suited to support comparative analyses
and cross-case lessons. Unfortunately,
as is sometimes the case with a collection
of essays, some authors approached this
requirement with more rigor than others. The essay on Rwanda, written by
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, follows the formula most closely; the chapter on
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